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EARL S. WOLAVERt
The origin of arbitration is lost in obscurity. At what time or place
man first decided to submit to his chief or to his friends for a decision and a
settlement with his adversary, instead of resorting to violence and self-help,
or to the public legal machinery available, is not known; and any inquiry
of this sort would belong more properly in the history of social growth and
ethics than in either law or economics.
In all religions there are many injunctions to be at peace with one's
neighbors and to be reconciled speedily with an adversary. Aristotle urged
the benefits of conciliation.' In Heraldus' Animadversiones 2 there is de-
scribed a court of reconcilement that existed among the Greeks. It was
common among the Romans "to put an end to litigation" by means of arbi-
tration.3 Bell says "this amicable private tribunal is of an earlier date than
the public courts." 4 The introduction of arbitration seems to be coeval with
the foundation of our law.5 In the earliest forms of society disputes were
tried by the heads of families, whence is derived the patriarchal tribunal now
given to the office of arbitrator.
6
From the charters that were issued to the English gilds, it is clear that
these traders recognized the value of some extrajudicial method and, in some
of the earlier books on the law merchant, it is certain the merchant preferred
justice "according to the Law of Merchants" to that of the common law.
The history of arbitration, unlike the history of law, is not an account
of the growth and development of principles and doctrines that have come,
through a long use, to have a general validity and force. While arbitration
probably antedates all the former legal systems, it has not developed any code
of substantive principles, but is, with very few exceptions, a matter of free
decision, each case being viewed in the light of practical expediency and
decided in accord with the ethical or economic norms of some particular
group. One case is not authority for another since the decisions are in terms
of persons and practices and not in accord with prescribed rules and doctrines.
If we assume that arbitration is a substitute for a proceeding at law and
that it is governed only by the sense and conscience of the arbitrators, it
'I Associate Professor of Business Law, University of Michigan; Past President, Ameri-
can Association of Instructors in Law in Collegiate Schools of Business (1932).
I. RHETORIC (circa 320 B. C.) bk. III, c. ii.
2. I, 372.
3. PANDFX bk. 4, t. 8.
4. LAW OF ARBITRATION, p. I.
5. CoHEN, COMxERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW (1918) 25.
6. CoNsoLATO DEL MAa BANCHUS (trans. circa 1300) 3.
(32)
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ARBITRATION
becomes, in substance, a species of moral and economic justice, or justice
according to the natural or universal law, the law which Ulpian says "Nature
teaches to all men and animals." It is a law imposed by lay arbitrators upon
contending parties because of an authority delegated by these parties to
arbitrators either by a contract or because of some moral duty to submit dis-
putes to arbitration, as in the trade gilds where the gildsman took an oath of
fealty to the wardens to submit all disputes to them.
In considering arbitration history, it is essential to note and classify the
situations wherein arbitration has been satisfactory and to note the situations
wherein it has failed. Also, in examining the thousands of occasions and
instances in which arbitration has been used-situations involving not only
every conceivable human relation, but the affairs of states and of nations, as
well-it is necessary at the outset to select the situations and practices that
form the background of our present commercial arbitration, and exclude the
rest.
To account for the origins of commercial arbitration the subject can be
conveniently discussed under two heads:
(i) The methods used by the gilds and the merchants in the dis-
patch of their affairs.
(2) The examination of the cases in the law of contracts that con-
tained arbitration agreements and the reaction of courts to them.
It is very common to say that commercial arbitration had its beginning
with the practices of the market and fair courts and in the merchant gilds.
It is true the gild merchant had wide grants of power as to trade. Mercantile
charters were granted to "the men of Ipswich" ' and to the "men of Glouces-
ter",' and to most of the trade towns, entitling those so chartered to extensive
privileges and rights. They were monopolistic in character and, in many
cases, the right to trade in a borough depended upon membership in a char-
tered gild. They took active part in the government of the town, though
their chief function was the protection of merchant privileges, guarding not
only the local gildsman's interest but also that of town traders who had sought
the markets of other towns. Pollock and Maitland describe a case where the
gildsmen of Gloucester made reprisals on gildsmen of another town for
harm done Gloucester traders in a foreign fair.9 There is good evidence
that they took a considerable part in inter-city trade warfare, for frequently
complaints were filed against the practice of certain of these gilds.
The gild was a part of the borough government "whose duty was to
maintain and regulate the trade monopoly. This was the raison d'etre of
7. 1 GRoss, THE GID MERCHANT (1890) 115.
8. RoT. CARTA 56.
9. 1 PoLLocx & MAITLAND, HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. IgI) 666.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the gild merchant of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries." 10 To become a
member a man was required to pay an initiation fee, furnish sureties who
would be responsible for the carrying out of his obligations, and take an oath
of fealty to the gild to maintain its laws and obey the wardens."
In addition to maintaining trade privileges, the gilds took a part in
regulating and settling difficulties that occurred among its members. Carter
regards this as arbitration. He says, "We may notice the institution known
as the Gild Merchant which seemingly was an association for the purpose
amongst others of mutual arbitration. Members of the same gild were bound
to bring their disputes before the gilds before litigating the matter else-
where." _12
In the charter of the Company of Clothworkers there is an elaborate
ordinance concerning the settlement of controversy.
"If any discord, strife or debate shall fortune to happen between
one householder and another of the said company-or between them or
any of their journeymen or apprentices or between any of the aforesaid
persons of the art or mystery of clothworkers which, without prejudice
of the laws of the realms, may be appeased by good and wise men; that
the said parties, before they move or attempt by course of law any suit
between them or against the other in that behalf, shall first show their
grief with the circumstance of the same to the wardens of said mystery
d . .- And if it shall seem to the masters and wardens that the matter
is difficult and beyond their reach to end and determine the same for
lack of better understanding of the laws of the realm or the custom of
clothiers, that then any of the said parties may take their remedy one
against the other without any further licence to be obtained at the hands
of the said warden." 13
The charter of the Gild of Yarmouth has this expression, "At which
feast (Trinity) all private quarrels and emulations were heard and
ended. . ," 14
In the charter of Bridgewater " for the promotion of love and
peace, have ordained that they will choose yearly two Seneschals of their Gild
and one bailiff to attend on them; such Seneschals to have power to punish
those offending against these ordinances. Any one convicted before the
Seneschals for maliciously imputing certain crimes to another shall be
amerced, etc. No one shall implead another without the burgh . . . to be
amerced; also any one opposing execution or distress made by order of the
Seneschals." 1
The gild was not a voluntary organization but drew its right to exist
from royal charter and exercised well-defined powers. It was a definite
i0. i GROSS, THE GiLD MERCHANT (1890) 43.
ii. Id. at 29.
12. ENGLISR LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1899) 268.
13. ORD. CLOTHWORKERS, LONDON, 29 ELIz. (1587).
14. 2 GRoss, op. cit. supra note 7, at 278.
15. Id. at 23.
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borough organization whose object was the maintenance and regulation of
merchants and their practices. Neither was it a religious or fraternal organ-
ization, as is frequently suggested. Gross says "the medieval gildsmen were
not always animated by lofty motives of brotherly love or self-abnegation." 16
It was a corporation with wide powers over men and goods.
The suggestion that the gilds maintained boards of arbitration for the
benefit of members is not borne out by the facts. Although the evidence is
very meagre it is reasonably certain that the gild developed its own court to
which members came not voluntarily but by order and summons. In cases
involving debt and covenant they were, in many cases, courts of original
jurisdiction.
The opinion of Carter that the "morning speeches" of the Gild Brethren
were only a "taking of council" and arbitration and settlement of disputes
among the members does not appear sound. That they were actual courts
which heard and tried cases in accord with well-established rules of law and
in accord with a fixed procedure seems more in accord with the facts. In
their history of the English law, Pollock and Maitland say:
"Further, at least in some cases, the gild merchant evolves out of
itself a court of justice which exists beside the law court of the borough.
This can hardly be prevented; the craft gilds of London evolve courts
of justice; the French and German merchants in London evolve courts
of justice; the learned universities evolve courts of justice; there can
hardly exist a body of men permanently united by any common interest
that will not make for itself a court of justice if it be left for a few years
to its own devices. The gild bretheren, at their 'morning-speeches', do
not merely take council for the maintenance of their privileges and the
regulation of their trade, but they assume to do justice. In the first
place, they decide questions of inheritance and succession. A person's
gilda, that is his right as a member of the gild, is treated as an object
of ownership. With the consent of the court, a man may give or sell it.
If he dies possessed of it, it will descend to his heir. And so at the
morning-speeches one person will come and demand against another the
'gild' of a dead ancestor 'as his right and inheritance', using the very
form of words by which he would have demanded ancestral lands. Such
disputes, such actions we must call them, the gildsmen hear and deter-
mine at their morning-speeches. But besides this, they entertain actions
of debt and covenant and trespass, and hardly dare we call such assem-
blies mere courts of arbitration, for they can enforce their own
decrees; . . ., 17
(I) Courts of the Fair
Another method of informal decision of disputes that enjoyed a wide
prevalence was that of the medieval Courts Merchant. The ancient mer-
16. Id. at 36.
17. 1 PoLCx & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 9, at 667.
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chants were itinerants who peddled their goods in all the continental markets
and fairs. Traveling together for protection, they carried their wares from
one fair to another, bartering and selling. s
The disputes of these traders were settled by "fair law" which was in
accord with the universal customs of merchants, and had no reference to the
courts of the realm. These were instituted much as our present-day consular
courts. There were consuls and prudhommes-some who traveled with the
merchant and whose advice was sought in matters of controversy, and some
who were permanently established in the staple towns. In addition to the
consuls, in the larger fairs constables, market masters, and mayors presided.
Carter remarks, "The foreign merchant was a person to be treated tenderly
for with him the King could deal directly," 10 and in the ordinance of
Edward I it was ordained, "And whereas the King doth will that no foreign
merchant shall be delayed by a long series of pleadings, the King doth com-
mand that the Wardens and Sheriffs shall hear daily the pleas of such for-
eigners as shall wish to make plaint against foreigners; and then speedy
redress be given unto them." 20
"When the King grants a fair or market the grantee shall have without
any words to that purpose, a court of record, called the Court of Pie-
powder." 21
They are called piepowder "because that for contracts and injuries done
concerning the fair or market, there shall be a speedy justice done for ad-
vancement of trade. . . . This is a court of record . and the juris-
diction thereof consisteth in four conclusions." 22
"The reason of their original institution seems to have been, to do
justice expeditiously among the variety of persons that resort from distant
places to a fair or market; since it is probable that no inferior court might
be able to serve its process, or execute its judgments, on both or either of
the parties; and therefore, unless this court had been erected the com-
plain(an)t must necessarily have resorted . . . to some superior judica-
ture." 23
"We ordain and establish that some certain loyal and discreet man living
in London shall be appointed a judge from among the merchants to recover
their debts . . . and give them a quick measure of justice from day to
day . . under a charter granted to merchants to decide questions which
arise among merchants and in accord with the law merchant." 24
i8. See various accounts of fairs in BEN JONSON, BARToET01Ewmv's FAIR; JOHN BUN-
YAN, PILGIM'S PROGRESS; BEWES, ROMANCE LAW MERCHANT (1923) 93 et seq.
19. Op. cit. supra note 12, at 269.
2o. LIBER ALRUS (1419) 257.
21. 3 CRUISE, DIGEST (2d Amer. ed. 1823) 18o, § 77.
22. 4 Co. INST. 271.
23. 3 BL. CoMM. *33.
24. PRYNNES, ANIMADVERSIONS (1669) 23.
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Mr. Cohen, in his book on commercial arbitration,25 is inclined to view
these courts as business men's tribunals, and Mr. Birdseye regards the mer-
chant courts as boards of arbitrators.
2 6
It would seem, if the term "arbitration" is used merely as descriptive
of a simple and speedy determination of a cause, without reference to a
formal procedure but in accord with the customs of a trade, the designation
arbitration is proper. If, however, arbitration is taken to mean the voluntary
submission of disputed matter to one or more arbitrators who will make an
award, and by consent substitute this board for the tribunals provided by the
state, then these proceedings in the Merchant Courts and the gilds were not
arbitrations, for both the gilds and fair courts had a fixed jurisdiction, "the
pleas betwixt strang folk, called pypondrous," 2T and in accord with mer-
chants "customary law approved by the authority of all kingdoms and not a
law established by the authority of any prince." 21
In addition, the Statute of the Staple 29 provided additional courts
merchant "that speedy and ready process shall be against him from day to
day and from hour to hour according to the law of the Staple." 30 It gave
to mayors and sheriffs complete jurisdiction over merchant causes. 31 Justices
in eyre or assize were precluded from hearing cases properly within the cog-
nizance of the mayor or constable. 32 It also provided "that all staple mer-
chants should be ruled by the law merchant and not by the common law," 33
and speedy justice shall be done to them ". . . without sparing any man
or to drive them to sue at the common law." 34
Both the Carta Mercatoria and the Statute of the Staple provided how
merchant juries should be drawn and how constituted, and fixed the duty of
the mayor as justice, and the method of serving process and compelling
attendance.35 In the Black Book of Admiralty 3 ' the prudhommes "are of
coordinate authority with the king." One of the records of the courts of
Bristol says, "The Tolzey Court is an old court of Record by prescription"
from Saxon times. In this court was the process of foreign attachment of
immemorial usage to recover debts from foreigners, through attachment,
seizing of cargoes and goods, and enforced payment.
37
It appears, therefore, that the gild and fair courts were part of the
English judicial system that heard cases which were not justiciable at com-
25. I COHEN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1, 9.
26. 1 BnmsmE, ARBImRATioN AND BusINESS ETHICS (1926) 23.
27. BLAcK BOoK OF ADMIRALTY.
28. MALYNES, LEx MERmFTomA (1622) Preface.
29. 27 EDw. III (1353).
3o. Id. c. 2.
31. Id. c. 21.
32. Id. c. 5.
33. Id. c. 8.
34. Id. C. 20.
35. See 27 EDw. III, and SELCT PLEAS IN MANORIAL COURTs (Seld. Soc. i888) 153.
36. 2 BLACK BooK OF ADmIRALTY (1871) Introduction, lxvii.
37. CARTER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 267n.
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mon law because of procedural difficulties and because the merchant was
regarded as subject to foreign law, rather than tribunals that merely served
as arbitrators of disputes. It may safely be concluded that arbitration, as it
is understood today, was unknown as a policy or a practice of the fair courts
or gilds.
(II) Common Law-Doctrine of Revocability
At the common law it has been very generally held that the arbitration
clause in a contract can be revoked. It is well settled that the clause cannot
be pleaded either in bar or abatement to any action or suit, either at law or
in equity. By giving notice of revocation either of the parties can be put to
an end to the authority and power of the other to name arbitrators. 38
The question of revocability goes back to a dictum in Vynior's Case.39
This was an action of debt upon a bond brought by Vynior against Wilde
for failure to submit disputes to arbitrators. Defendant Wilde set up that
no award had been made to which plaintiff rejoined that the defendant had
revoked his authority "to submit to stand to and abide an award. Defendant
demurred and judgment went to the plaintiff to recover the full penalty." 40
The case is sound, and representative of the law of the times. It was a
bond under seal and enforceable by the obligee when any of the conditions
endorsed in it were revoked. The practice of giving penal bonds to enforce
engagements was very common. It was usually the practice to put the bond
at a high figure as a means of insurance of performance. Writing of these
instruments, Professor Barbour says: "It seems to have been not uncommon
that a debtor . . . should bind himself in double the amount of the actual
debt . . . he could collect the full sum named in the deed; for the common
law received such evidence as conclusive." 41 It is doubtful whether, in
Coke's time, there could have been a recovery on the promises, so the parties
insured themselves of performance with sealed deeds.
The case would long ago have been forgotten but for the dictum-"if I
submit myself to an arbitriment . . . yet I may revoke it for my act, or
my words cannot alter the judgment of the law to make that irrevocable
which is of its own nature revocable." 42
This argument is unnecessary to anything decided in the case. The
validity of the bond depended on its seal and when the obligor revoked the
arbitration authority, the bond became enforceable. The proposition as to
38. Boston & Lowell R. R. v. Nashua & L. R. R., 139 Mass. 463, 31 N. E. 751 (885) ;
Meachem v. Jamestown R. R., 211 N. Y. 346, lo5 N. E. 653 (1914) ; Henry v. Lehigh Valley
Coal Co., 215 Pa. 448, 64 Atl. 635 (19o6) ; Gray v. Wilson, 4 Watts 39 (Pa. 1835) ; Corbin
v. Adams, 76 Va. 58 (i1) ; Mead v. Owen, 83 Vt. 132, 74 Atl. io5s (igo).
39. 8 Co. 8oa, 8ib (16o9), decided by Lord Coke.
40. This is not the first case that supports a revocation. It is upheld in Y. B. Pas. 28
Hen. VI, f. 6, pl. 4 (1449) ; Y. B. Hil. 21 Hen. VI, f. 3oa, pl. 14 (1442); Y. B. Trin. 5 Ed.
IV, f. 3b, pl. 2 (465) ; Y. B. Mich. 8 Ed. IV, f. 9b, ioa, pl. 9 (1468).
41. 5 HOLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENG. LAW (1924) 293.
42. 8 Co. 8oa, 8b (16o9).
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the right to revoke powers or authorities is not in question, but the case is
continually referred to as the basic authority for revocation of submissions.
It is suggested that Coke held the arbitration authority revocable because of
the general hostility of the common law judges to arbitration. This argu-
ment is hardly tenable, for in this case he enforced a bond for failure to
arbitrate and had there been any hostility the whole covenant could have been
held void under the convenient doctrine of public policy.
There is no suggestion in Vynior's Case that these agreements are revo-
cable because they oust the courts of jurisdiction. This reason was not
definitely assigned until the case of Kill v. Hollister.3 The case is very short
and no authority is cited, or any reason given for the doctrine. The explana-
tion for this perhaps may be found in the changes in the law that had occurred
since Vynior's Case. Shortly after the latter, Equity refused to enforce
obligations in bonds for any more than damage proved.4 4  The Statute
against Fines prevented the recovery of penalties, hence it seems clear that
obligations could no longer be forced by penal bonds. The reason for the
decision in Kill v. Hollister may have been the jealousy of the court of its
right, or, perhaps, the desire to discourage persons from seeking any but the
authorized tribunals to determine rights and duties, or for reasons of public
policy-to deny support to any agreement by which the individual contracted
away his legal rights. Whatever may have been the reason, the case stands
as authority.
In 1743 Lord Hardwicke had said in the case of Wellington v. Mac-
intosh 46 that it was not suitable to the dignity of the court to give a discovery
for the purpose of an arbitration. In this case a plea that there had been no
submission was overruled, but in overruling it he said, "I would not have it
understood that such an agreement might not be made in such kind of articles
and pleaded; but such a clause should have in it a power given to the arbi-
trators to examine the parties as well as witnesses upon oath." 47
There is no suggestion here of ouster of the court, but it is quite gen-
erally cited as authority for overruling a plea that there had been no refer-
ence, the fact that the court offered no reason notwithstanding. Kill v.
Hollister and Wellington v. Macintosh were considered in the case of Mitchell
v. Harris,4, where it was argued: "There is no sense in what is said in
Kill v. Hollister that such covenants cannot be permitted as the agreement
of the parties cannot oust the jurisdiction of the Court. It is not ousted more
than by a release of all right of action." 49 In this same case the Chancellor
43. I Wilson 129 (K. B. 1746).
44. See 5 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 41 at 293.
45. 8 & 9 Wm. III, c. 11 (16!97).
46. 2 Atk. 569 (Ch. 1743).
47. Id. at 570.
48. 2 Ves. 129 (Ch. 1793).
49. Id. at 131.
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in referring to Wellington v. Macintosh says, "There is no doubt that the
reporter has mistaken Lord Hardwicke's reasons in the case. He has only
taken down part of what was said and has misapplied that-but still the case
stands as a clear authority that the plea was overruled." 5
Kill v. Hollister and Wellington v. Macintosh were accepted as the un-
disputed authority for supporting revocations, without any regard whatsoever
to the fact that one case offered no reason at all, and the other a doubtful and
fragmentary reason at best. Still these cases persist and as late as 1856 were
seriously discussed as authorities.
In 1788 Lord Kenyon had occasion to examine the question of arbitra-
tion in the case of Halfhide v. Fenning.5' In this case a plea that there had
been no reference was allowed to be good, the court saying, "Such references
are very advantageous to the parties; as arbitrators are more competent to
the settling of complicated accounts." 52 In commenting on Wellington v.
Macintosh, Lord Kenyon says, "Lord Hardwicke's opinion must be mis-
reported." 53 The Halfhide case in point of time clearly overrules Welling-
ton v. Macintosh and Kill v. Hollister, but, curiously, the reporter adds,
"This [the Halfhide] is a singular case and in direct opposition to Lord
Hardzuicke's opinion in Wellington v. Macintosh . . .; it has since been
repeatedly overruled" 54-but this last is doubtful. In the case of Mitchell v.
Harris' Lord Loughborough says that Halfhide v. Fenning is a singular
case and in opposition to Wellington v. Macintosh in which, whatever reasons
are assigned for Lord Hardwicke's determination, the plea was manifestly
overruled; and that it is quite inconsistent with the resolution of King's
Bench in Kill v. Hollister.
The authority of Halfhide v. Fenning is again doubted in Street v.
Rigby,56 the Chancellor (Eldon) saying, "I doubt whether it is a very wise
exercise of the jurisdiction of this court recollecting that it is to give relief
beyond the law, not to order the parties to go to Law to take the effect of
the stipulated remedy, but under a positive covenant . . . that they will not
sue . . and send them to that jurisdiction (arbitrators) so likely to mis-
carry." 57 The opinion is very poorly reasoned. It is rested more on an
unfortunate experience of one of Lord Eldon's clients in the matter of Price
v. Williams 58 than on a careful analysis of Kenyon's decision in Halfhide v.
Fenning.
Again in Waters v. Taylor,59 Eldon says, "Taking the general doctrine
now to be according to Lord Hardwicke's opinion which goes upon the prin-
So. Id. at 135.
51. 2 Bro. C. C. 336 (Ch. 1788).
52. Id. at 337.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. 2 Ves. 129 (Ch. 1793).
56. 6 Ves. 815 (Ch. X8o2).
57. Id. at 821.
58. 3 Bro. Cas. 163 (Ch. 1790).
59. IS Ves. io (CI. i8o7).
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ciple that this court has powers of inquiry beyond those of an arbitrator...
with reference to the case of I-alfhide v. Fenning I admit that upon the best
authority the opinion expressed by Lord Kenyon in that case is wrong . . .
and as a general proposition therefore . . . an agreement to refer disputes
to arbitration will not bind the parties even to submit to arbitration . . .
before they come into court." 60 In this deed the party had expressed "great
anxiety to keep out of court" and of this Lord Eldon said, "Accordingly I
thought it within the scope of my discretion to give the recommendation...
of giving the parties an opportunity of preserving themselves from the ruin
that must be the necessary consequence of an active interference of this
Court." 61 At another place he says the deed "shews their intention against
the interference of any other jurisdiction, until they have tried the effect of
the special means, provided by themselves; . " 62 In this case it is im-
possible to tell whether it is the anxious desire of the parties or the value of
arbitration in this partnership dispute that leads the court to the reference.
o w,,ere says thei court can ue ue but is in accoI wiL the idea of
holding it in abeyance until self-help has been tried. Analytically the case
adds little to what was concluded in Wellington v. Macintosh.
In 1844, in the case of Dimsdale v. Robertson 63 after a careful exami-
nation of all the authorities the court comes to the conclusion that Lord
Kenyon's position in Halfhide v. Fenning is sound, and says, "I think Half-
hide v. Fenning is still law."
The case of paramount authority is that of Scott v. Avery.64 In this
case it was held that parties by contract may not oust courts but that they
may agree by a contract that no cause of action shall arise until a reference
is made and a decision had. In his decision Lord Campbell said, "Is there
anything contrary to public policy in saying that the company shall not be
harrassed by actions, the costs of which might be ruinous, but that any dispute
that rises shall be referred to a domestic tribunal? . . . I cannot see the
slightest ill consequence can flow from it. . . . Public policy therefore
seems to me to require that effect should be given to the contract." 65 As to
ousting the court he says, "It probably originated in the contests of the dif-
ferent courts in ancient times for extent of jurisdiction, all of them being
opposed to anything that would deprive every one of them of jurisdiction." 66
In the report of this case in the LAW JOURNAL 67 it is stated that Lord
Campbell said, "There was no disguising the fact that as formerly, the
emoluments of the judges depended mainly or almost entirely on fees, and
6o. Id. at 34, 18.
6r. Id. at 23.
62. Id. at i8.
63. 2 Jo. & Lat. 58 (Ir. Eq. 844).
64. 5 H. L. Cas. 81i (1856).
65. Id. at 853.
66. Ibid.
67. 25 L. J. (N. s.) 313 (Ex. 1856).
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as they had no fixed salary there was great competition to get as much as
possible of litigation into Westminster Hall and there was a great scramble
in Westminster Hall for the division of the spoil. . . . And they had great
jealousy of arbitration whereby Westminster Hall was robbed of those
cases."
The same year, in the case of Russell v. Pellegrini 6s Lord Campbell
said again, "Somehow the courts of law had, in former times, acquired a
horror of arbitration; and it was even doubted if a clause for a general ref-
erence of prospective disputes was legal. I never could imagine for what
reason parties should not be permitted to bind themselves to settle their dis-
putes in any manner on which they agreed." 69
Scott v. Avery may be said to be the last great case on revocability.
Before it, Kill v. Hollister had been considered the authority and the only
one resting on the doctrine of ousting the courts. The case of Kill v. Hol-
lister can hardly be said to be reversed, but from 1856 to the present the
decisions deal with interpretation and modification of the principles of Scott
v. Avery.
Some doubt seemed to exist as to the authority of Scott v. Avery, for in
the case of Horton v. Sayer,7" decided in 1859, the court rejected a plea for
reference, the court saying (Pollock, C. B.), "It appears to me this case is
distinguishable from Scott v. Avery; . . . it falls within the rule which
has been acted on for above a century, according to which the superior Courts
of law cannot be ousted of their jurisdiction by the mere agreement of the
parties; . , 7-1 This case of Horton v. Sayer was not followed in 1862,
however, but in Tredwen v. Holnan 72 the court said, "We are of opinion
that this case is governed by Scott v. Avery and not by that of Hortonv v.
Sayer." 73
In 1875, in the case of Ripley v. Great Northern Ry.,7 4 Jessel, M. R.,
said, "Certainly these arbitrations have not been looked upon very favorably
by courts of law. Many strict and some absurd rules were laid down at a
period when courts of law seemed to consider a reference to arbitration to
be something wrong, or as an attempt to oust the ordinary jurisdiction of
the court. That period has passed away." 75
So in 1879, in Collins v. Locke7 6 it was said, "Since the case of Scott v.
Avery . . . the contention that such a clause is bad as an attempt to oust
68. 6 E. & B. 1o2o (K. B. 1856).
69. Id. at o25.
70. 4 H. & N. 643 (Ex. 1859).
71. Id. at 649.
72. 1 H. & C. 72, 81 (Ex. 1862).
73. But see Mills v. Bayley, 2 H. & C. 36 (Ex. 1863), where the same judge follows
Milne v. Gratex, which depends upon Vynior's Case. See also Elliott v. Royal Exchange
Assurance Co., L. R. 2 Ex. 237 (1867) ; Thompson v. Anderson, L. R. 9 Eq. 522 (1854);
Edwards v. Aberayon Ins. Society, i Q. B. D. 563 (875).
74. 31 L. T. R. (N. s.) 869 (Ch. 1875).
75. Id. at 870.
76. 4 App. Cas. 674 (1879).
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the Court of jurisdiction may be passed by. The questions to be considered
in the case of such clauses are, whether an arbitration or award is necessary
")77before a complete cause of action arises.. , .
In this case the court quotes favorably from Edwards v. Aberayon
Insurance Society,78 where Brett, J., said: "The true limitation of Scott V.
Avery seems to me to be . . . that if parties to a contract agree to a stipu-
lation in it, which imposes, as a condition precedent to the maintenance of a
suit or action for the breach of it, the settling by arbitration the amount of
damage, or the time of paying it, or any matters of that kind which do not
go to the root of the action . . . such stipulation prevents any action being
maintained until the particular facts have been settled by arbitration." -19
In the examination of the cases from Vynior's Case to the present, it is
possible to conclude: The doctrine of Vynior's Case is now repudiated since
the doctrine of penalties and fines has been abolished, and any effect penal
bonds may have had in forcing arbitrations is-now impossible. The doctrine
of Kill v. Hollister, which is the authority that courts may not be ousted, is
still the law, as it is generally conceded at the common law that the agreement
of the parties cannot oust the court. This proposition is not denied even in
Scott v. Avery which is rather erroneously presumed to have changed the law
and to have repudiated Kill v. Hollister. What was decided in Scott v. Avery
is that, parties cannot oust the courts of their jurisdiction, but they may con-
tract that no cause of action shall arise until differences that may arise have
been referred to arbitrators. That this case should have been regarded as the
leading one upon the subject and the final authority may be due to the
dramatic utterances of Lord Campbell about judges' fees, or to the fact that it
overhauled and restated all the earlier learning on the subject, and because a
good many of the cases subsequent to it treat it with undue respect and
authority. It is interesting to note that most writers urging the virtues of
arbitration never fail to cite fully the doctrines of Scott v. Avery and Russell
v. Pellegrini. The doctrine of condition precedent is earlier than Scott v.
Avery and the case is only a reaffirmance of what was already the law. At
best Scott v. Avery represents one of the various views of the English law
of arbitration and is scarcely entitled to the exalted place it holds.
From as early as 1698, various statutory regulations upon arbitration
have been passed;8 0 their existence demonstrates an interest in the subject,
but their content is not greatly helpful in filling in the picture of the attitude
77. Id. at 689. To the same effect see a well-reasoned opinion of Coleridge in Trainor v.
Phoenix Fire Assurance Co., 65 L. T. R. 825 (Ch. 18yi). See also Jackson v. Barry Ry.,
68 L. T. R. 472 (1893) ; Spurrier v. LaCloche, 71 L. J. ioi (K. B. 1902) ; Gaw v. British
Law Fire Ins. Co., [i9o8] i Ir. R. 245.
78. 1 Q. B. D. 563 (1875).
79. Id. at 596. For a complete list of the later cases see I MEws DIGFST, Tit. Reference
Condition Precedent.
8o. The first statute was that of 8 & 9 Wir. III, c. I5 (698). Later regulations may be
found in 3 & 4 Wx. IV, c. 42 (1833); 17 & i8 Vicr., c. 125 (1854); 52 & 53 VIcr., c. 49
(I889).
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taken by the business man of olden time toward arbitration. A r6sum6 of
their contents sufficient for further discussion in this issue may be found in
Professor Simpson's discussion of equitable enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate."' It remains now to sum up the attitude of the medieval merchant
toward the arbitration process.
Conclusion
Geraud Malynes, a mercantilist of the I7 th century, said the trader
preferred the law of merchants as a "law not too cruell in her frowns, nor
too partiall in her favors." 82 Why the merchant chose this loose and infor-
mal method of decision to the deliberative and well-ordered common law, has
always been a matter of interesting speculation.
There is one case that suggests a "gentleman" and a "trader" might be
judged by different laws.s3 Malynes indicates that merchant controversy
might be decided in chancery, at common law, or by the merchants, 4 but
the preference of the trader was for the courts merchant. It is also common
knowledge that until the time of Lord Mansfield, the English Court was
poorly equipped to cope with merchant causes. The common law judge,
unlike the Roman praetor who supplemented the jus civile with the more
liberal jus gentium, had not expanded the narrow insular law of the English
to meet the needs of a general commerce. Says Lord Campbell, "Mercantile
questions were so ignorantly treated when they came to Westminster Hall
that they were usually settled by private arbitration among the merchants
themselves." 85
A typical expression from the early books is the following from
Malynes: "Merchant affairs in controversy ought with all brevity to be
decided to avoid interruption of the traffick." 86 Traders always thought of
the common law as something beyond their experience. It was local, not
general, custom, and its processes were slow and formal. It is perfectly cer-
tain the merchant had a great need of rule and law, but it was rule and law
in the market and as he and his kind knew and practiced it. It was not
deduction from cases; it was self-generative from transactions themselves.
He ordinarily found it possible to operate his affairs without controversy or
aid of lawyers or courts, but should he find himself at odds with someone
in the course of trade, he had an all-complete system of law to direct the
settlement.
Ancient and modern traders have always felt a great reluctance about
becoming involved in litigation. Expense and delay are the usual reasons
offered, but a stronger reason is that suits at law are contentious and seriously
81. Infra, p. I6o, at 164 et seq.
82. MAI.vYNs, loc. cit. supra note 28.
83. Witherley v. Sarsfeild, I Shower 125 (K. B. 1678).
84. MIALYFas, op. cit. supra note 28, c. XiV.
85. 3 LIvES OF THE CHIEF JusTicEs (1873) 274.
86. MALYNEs, op. cit. supra note 28, at 303.
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affect business good will, and the trader was, and still is, far more interested
in continuing business relations than in preserving his legal rights. The
ancient trader found in the piepowder court a broad and understandable jus-
tice and also in the market judge a shrewd and practical trader who knew
that bargains had to be honest lest the fair of which he was head should come
to grief. The only records of these proceedings are to be found in the Roll
of St. Ives Fair.sr They bind their bargains with drinks and God's pennies,
and recitation of signs. The market master appeared as an understanding
and capable individual, well versed in this laymen's lore and ordered that
amends be made or bargains cancelled or gone through with in accord with
the universal custom of merchants.
To attempt to say whether these market practices were arbitration or
adjudication is not an easy thing. 8 The ancient books speak of merchant
law, and merchant courts. They say nothing of arbitration or arbitration
tribunals or submissions or references. Such terminology is the property of
the common law tribunal. Pollock thinks they were law courts. Carter
thinks the procedure was arbitration, and Lord Campbell is inclined to that
view.
Not to trifle over terms-"The law of a community consists of the
general rules which are followed by its judicial department in establishing
legal rights and duties." 89 Says Salmond, "The law may be defined as the
body of principles recognized and applied by the State in the administration
of justice." 90 It is quite clear that until the days of Mansfield, merchant
rules were considered as special customs, sometimes as foreign law, and
merely submitted to the jury. These rules were frequently referred to as
private international law, and if Austin is to be regarded as sound, "improp-
erly so called", as they are only law by way of analogy. The merchant in
many instances was, in insisting upon his own law, relying on his own special
practice and customs which were no part of the law of the realm. The prin-
ciples upon which decision is had, are extrajudicial. If this is true, the
argument that piepowder court proceedings were arbitration is strengthened.
On the other hand, it may be argued that pure arbitration is free decision,
compromise or adjustment in terms of moral right and justice and unrelated
to any fixed scheme, and that merchant rules were well settled and established,
though not recognized by the Royal Court, and therefore, the proceedings
amounted to adjudication, but in terms of a foreign law. But if arbitration
is decision by any means other than by a state court, then these practices were
arbitrations.
87. I SmEEcr PLEAS IN MAN RLAL COURTS (Seld. Soc. 1888) i3o-i6o. The fullest and
most complete account of the merchant and his law is one by Nathan Isaacs, The Merchant
and His Law (1915) 23 J. PoL. EcoN. 529.
88. See pp. I35-138 supra.
89. GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1916) I.
90. JURISPRUDENCE (1902) I.
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Additional strength is given to the arbitration argument by the fact that
the law merchant, being regarded as a system of natural justice, expanded
immensely the possibilities of the market master. The limit of natural jus-
tice is human experience, while the civil law is only that quantum of nat-
ural justice that is recognized and enforced by a particular state. The
market master was interested in fair dealing as a means of preserving the
good name of the Fair. He would order traders to "make amends". The
swindler was put out. Merchants palming off brass for gold or measuring
goods with false measures were summarily punished. His justice was as
one human being with another, and his aim was the well-being of his business
and his kind.
The question narrows itself down to the proposition-how shall we
regard proceedings that are not conducted in accord with the practices of
established state courts? Coke with no imagination merely described them.
Holt belligerently announced the merchants could tell him nothing. Mans-
field, more broadly trained in continental practices and legal systems, felt
these practices of merchants should be made part of the law of England, and
as Austin would say, he translated customs into law. In its legal develop-
ment, arbitration has very generally been associated with contracts. It is
usually discussed in terms of delegated powers or promises, while merchant
practices have generally been regarded as a special proceeding under foreign
law.
